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U.S. Foreign Contractors' Standing
to Sue in United States Courts
The question of access of the U.S. foreign contractor to the United States
Courts may be considered: (a) as an incident of commercial relations between
the U.S. Government and an alien; (b) in relation to the rights and
responsibilities of states dealing with aliens; (c) in connection with an
international standard for treatment of aliens; (d) as a problem in conflict of
laws; and (e) as expressive of one of the universal human rights.
Despite the fact that the United States Governmental preferences to domestic
producers are more visible than those in most other countries,I the world-wide
involvement of the United States makes it compulsory for the U.S. Government
to buy goods and services from foreign contractors. One estimate indicates that
in fiscal year 1972, the U.S. Department of Defense alone spent $2 billion for
supplies and services outside the United States. 2 There are quite a few other
departments and agencies of the U.S. Government that are engaged in
procurement abroad.
The main purpose of this paper is to explore the issue of the standing of the
foreign contractor in U.S. courts. This is the first issue to be resolved before a
foreign contractor can seek relief against the United States Government in those
courts. The issue of standing of a foreign contractor in the U.S. Court of Claims
may arise at contract administration or performance level, in the form of
seeking additional compensation or equitable adjustment due to changes,
changed conditions, escalation of costs, liquidated damages, etc. The question
of the standing of a foreign contractor before the U.S. Federal courts may arise
at preperformance level in the form of judicial review of an agency action, e.g.,
an alien contractor seeking injunctive or declaratory relief against the
administrator or officials of the U.S. Government department or agency as
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'Williams Commission Report: United States International Economic Policy in Interdependent
World. submitted by the Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy, July 1971.
2Military Prime ContractAwards, July 1971-June 1972, p. 44 in the REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
ON GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT VOL. 3, U.S. Government Printing Office, Dec. 1972 p. 38.
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disappointed bidder to protect his "interests." In this paper the author does not
deal with problems arising out of "conflict of laws" in deciding the jurisdiction
of courts. In the following pages standing has been dealt with before: [I. United
States Court of Claims; II. Other United States Federal Courts.]
The civil law makes the government, in matters of ordinary obligation subject
to the suit of the citizen in the ordinary or administrative tribunals of the
country; and this liability is not a device of modern civilization, but has been
deemed inherent in the system. The Civil Code of the Kingdom of Italy of 1866
recognized this principle, and expressly provided that "in suits pending before
the judicial authority, between private persons and the public administration,
the proceedings shall always take place formally at the regular session. '
Whereas the undisputed maxim of the common law has been that the
sovereign cannot be sued except by his consent, only voluntary submission on
the part of the crown could secure a judicial hearing, in favor of private claims
against it. And this was granted in England at an early date. "The Petition of
Right," the oldest remedy, is said to have originated in the time of Edward I.
The concept "The King can do no wrong" is considered repugnant to sound
principles today in the United States, but it took almost 100 years after the birth
of the nation before that inherited doctrine of common law was modified.
4
Writings of publicists support the view that a state has no right to refuse, in
all instances, to open its courts to foreigners, such action would provide one of
grounds for a claim of denial of justice. A more recent tendency is to stress the
positive obligations of states to make courts accessible to foreigners. VeDors,
for example, regards access as one of the minimal rights which states are
obligated to accord by "Droit international general." Roth submits that one of
the "fundamental international obligations incumbent upon the state is to grant
the alien free access to court for the protection and enforcement of his right." 6
Thus the right of citizens to bring their governments to courts has been
recognized under civil and common law systems. With the advancement of
international trade and commerce there has been tremendous increase of the
governmental involvement in activities having their impact beyond national
frontiers. Increasing realization by the governments that there can be no
commerce without contracts, nor contracts without actions, nor actions without
courts, nor courts without persons who have proper standing to sue before the
courts, many governments have considered it proper to extend the right of their
citizens to bring the governments to the courts, to the non-citizens, aliens-
'Fichera v. U.S., 9 Ct. Cl. 254.
'For a review of its history, see Sherry, The Myth That the King Can Do No Wrong, 22 ADMIN. L.
REV. 597 (1970).
'Us regles internationales concernant le traitement des etrangers, Academie de Droit
International, Recuail des Cours vol. 37 (1931), Il1, 352-354.
'ROTH, THE MINIMUM STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLIED TO ALIENS 181 (1941).
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natural as well as legal persons-either on the principle of "reciprocity" that is
recognized by all civilized nations of the world7 or under unilateral arrange-
ments."
I. United States Court of Claims
The Court of Claims was established by an Act of Feb. 24, 1855,1 but it began
as little more than an arm of the Congress, authorized to investigate claims
against the government and make reports to Congress for final action. The
court continues to discharge this function through its Chief Commissioner, but
the inadequacy of its power was soon recognized. President Lincoln, in his 1861
message to the Congress, urged strongly that the court's judgment be made
final. The Act of March 3, 186310 unsuccessfully attempted to do just that, but
it was not until 1966, when Congress removed the requirement of treasury
appropriations to pay each claim, that the court's judgment carried with it the
freedom from executive revisory authority. This authority was regarded as
indispensable by the Supreme Court in its 1864 Gordon Case. 12
The 1855 Act had established the scope of the Court's jurisdiction as
including "all claims founded upon any law of Congress, or upon any regulation
of an executive department, or upon any contract express or implied with the
government of the United States, and all claims which may be referred to it by
either House of Congress." The 1863 Act added counter claims and set off
against any claimant. It should be pointed out here the broad jurisdiction
conferred on the Court of Claims by "all claims," "any contract," "founded on
any law of Congress or any regulation" implicitly covers any or all foreign/
international claims founded on contract, express or implied, or on any law of
Congress, or any regulation of any executive department, against the United
States.
Through the years, many pieces of legislation have added to or limited the
Court's jurisdiction in particular areas but the broadest and most significant
addition to the Court's initial jurisdictional framework was the Tucker Act of
'The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation is one of the most familiar instruments
known to diplomatic tradition, that is commonly used to describe a basic accord fixing the ground
rules governing day to day intercourse between countries, designates the medium par excellence
through which nations have sought in general settlement to secure "reciprocal" respect for their
normal interests abroad. On Jan. 1973 such treaties in force between the United States of America
and Argentina, Belgium, China (Taiwan), Denmark, Estonia,* Greece, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Korea, Liberia, Nepal, Netherlands, Norway, Pakistan, Paraguay, Switzerland, Turkey,
Luxembourg, Austria, Finland, Honduras, Iran, Latvia,* Oman, Germany, Federal Republic of,
Bolivia, Brunei, Colombia, Thailand, Ethiopia, Tonga, Togo, Philippines, Vietnam. *The U.S. has
not recognized the incorporation of Estonia and Latvia into the U.S.S.R. The Department of State
regards these treaties with them as continuing in force.




"Act of March 17, 1866, 14 Stat. 9.
"Gordon v. U.S., 69 U.S. 561 (1864).
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1887.13 This Act added to the 1855 grant of jurisdiction, claims founded upon
the Constitution, thus providing an explicit remedy for the taking of private
property for public use and claims "for damages liquidated or unliquidated, in
cases not sounding in tort." At the same time, it provided that District Courts
would have concurrent jurisdiction on all such matters as the Court of Claims.
The provisions in the Tucker Act for multiple forums for claims against the
government could have signaled a fundamental shift in policy, with the
government thereafter to be exposed to major litigation in every judicial district
throughout the country. 4 The Tucker Act did open the district courts to
litigants-including contractors with claims against the government.
The other legislative grafting upon the Court's original grant of jurisdiction
has been limited in scope, though some has been of substantial importance to
classes of litigants, e.g., patent infringement by government taking or use was
covered by legislation in 1910 and 1918.15 In 1946 Congress, wearied of ad hoc
enactments, gave the courts jurisdiction to hear Indian Tribal Claims arising
thereafter. I" There have been a number of other statutory provisions relating to
the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims.I7
The competency of the U.S. Court of Claims to pronounce on the obligations
of the U.S. Government arising out of international matters was recognized
long ago by the Congress, by expanding the jurisdiction of the Court by Special
Acts 8 and a whole line of cases that developed under these acts." The
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims in matters involving foreign contractors has
been further facilitated and expanded by the Rules of the U.S. Court of Claims
under which the Commissioner has the authority to decide the time and the
place of the trial with due regard to the places of residence of the claimant and
the witnesses and the degree of convenience of all concerned.
Court of Claims Sitting Abroad-"Matter of Right" or "Matter of Grace"
Rule 132(b)(2) of the U.S. Court of Claims 0 reads as follows:
"128 U.S.C. 1346.
'Act of July 30, 1974, 28 U.S.C. 2402. The jury trial prohibition applies to the district courts
with respect to its torts claims jurisdiction.
'36 Stat. 851 (1910), 40 Stat. 705 (1918), 28 U.S.C. 1498 (a). Claims growing out of copyright
infringement were added in 1960, 74 Stat. 855-6, 28 U.S.C. 1498 (b).
'60 Stat. 1049, 28 U.S.C. 1505.
'Renegotiation Act of 1951. In 1971 jurisdiction of appeals from excess profits determinations of
the Renegotiation Board was transfered from the U.S. Tax Court to the U.S. Court of Claims; Pub.
L. No. 90-545, 82 Stat. 931 (1968), establishing the Redwood National Park and creating jurisdic-
tion in the court for taking in connection therewith; other examples are Statutes relating to claims of
oyster growers arising out of dredging operations (49 Stat. 1040, 28 U.S.C. 1947); and claim arising
out of war contracts (41 U.S.C. 101-125).
"Spanish American War Claims, Act of March 12th., 1863; Tucker Act of 1887; The French
Spoliations Act of 1885.
"For a complete discussion of these cases see J.H. Toelle, The Court of Claims-its Jurisdiction
and Principal Decisions Bearing on International Law, 24 MICH. L. REV. 675 (1925-26).
"Rules of the United States Court of Claims, Revised Sept. 1969.
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Time; place; notice; exhibits
(2) The place of trial shall be fixed by the Commissioner with due regard to (i) the
places of the residence of the claimant and the witnesses, and (ii) the degree of
convenience of all concerned to be served by convening at some central place.
This rule not only authorizes sittings in different states in the United States,
but the authority under this section has also been exercised to conduct sittings
in different parts of the world. A brief survey of records of the finance office of
the U.S. Court of Claims conducted by the author for the purposes of this paper,
revealed that between 1959-73 about 14 trips abroad have been taken by the
Trial Judges (Commissioners) and Judges of the Court of Claims on official
business consisting of trial hearings, taking depositions in conjunction with
cases before the Court. Further research revealed that these trips included visits
to:
Australia - in Concrete Industries (Monier) Ltd. v. U.S., Congressional
reference case No. 6-70 (pending).
Netherlands - (Antilles) in Photo Corporation v. U.S., Ct. Cl. Docket No.
28-69 (pending).
Germany- in Harol C. Keil v. U.S., Ct. CI. Docket No. 142-65.
Paris - in Leonard J. Gause v. U.S., Ct. Cl. Docket No. 240-62.
Italy - in Congressional reference case No. 7-58.
Sweden - in Congressional reference case No. 2-58.
United Kingdom - in Pulling & Co. Ltd. v. U.S., Ct. Cl. Docket No. 331-60.
Regarding the question whether the foreign contractor is entitled to hearing
by the Court of Claims in his country, the prevailing view of the Court of
Claims2 is that all the rules of U.S. Court of Claims regarding the conduct of
hearings would be applicable; and that the Court of Claims conducts hearings
abroad as a matter of grace and not as a matter of right of the alien contractor.
This treatment is subject to the statutory requirement of "reciprocity."
The author tends to agree with the above position only in part. First
the requirement of "reciprocity," 28 U.S.C. 2502, must be met. He agrees that
contracts between the U.S. Government and a foreign contractor present
unique situations, and special arrangements are required for the court's sitting
outside the U.S. As a matter of policy these arrangements need to be completed
through the U.S. Department of State with the foreign governments. In the
published Rules of the Court of Claims there is no specific mention of procedure
to be followed in conducting "business" of the court in a foreign country. The
language of Rule 132(b)(2)" is broad and lucid enough to authorize the court's
"In an interview conducted by the author with Commissioner Mastin G. White, of the Court of
Claims at his office on May 1, 1973, Commissioner White confirmed the prevailing view of the court
in very strong words.
"Supra note 20.
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conducting "business" in a foreign country, and this has been done before in a
number of cases as mentioned above establishing precedent.
Rule 132 (b)(2) 1 requires an objective test rather than subjective discretion of
the trial Commissioner, "the places of residence of the claimant and witnesses"
when comprised within "the degree of convenience of all concerned," bring out
an inevitable conclusion that a foreign contractor is entitled to "hearings" by
the U.S. Court of Claims in his country assuming the required special
arrangements having been made and approved by the host government and
U.S. Department of State, and the statutory requirement of reciprocity having
been satisfied.
It may be pointed out here (subject to a choice-of-laws clause of the contract)
that applicability of the Rules of the U.S. Court of Claims2 4 in governing the
conduct of business of the court in a foreign country, is liable to create
additional problems contradictory to various international obligations of the
United States. This view is further strengthened by the fact that the United
States has ratified the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad,
1968, on June 13, 1972, and thus rules of this Convention must be applied by
the Court of Claims in their sittings abroad.
The terms and purposes of the Convention have been well documented in the
"Report of the U.S. Delegation to Eleventh Session of the Hague Conference on
Private International Law," 8 International Legal Materials 804-20. The
Convention makes no major changes in U.S. procedure and requires no changes
in U.S. legislation or rules.2 5
Like the Documents Convention now in force, it is consistent with the policy
of Public Law 88-619,26 modernizing the U.S. law of international judicial
assistance in a number of respects.27 Although it does not provide the open
system of international judicial assistance that is found in Public Law 88-619,28
it is meant to provide major help to U.S. courts and litigants, especially the
Court of Claims and foreign contractor.
U.S. Statutory Requirement of "Reciprocity" and
Pertinent Decisions of the U.S. Court of Claims
In the United States, 28 U.S.C. 2502 provides for an alien's privilege to sue
the United States in the Court of Claims if: (i) the subject of suit is otherwise
" Id. 20.
"Id. 20.
"See Philip W. Amram, U.S. Ratification of the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad, 67 AJIL No. 1 104-6 (1973).
"78 Stat. 995, amending 18 U.S.C. §1621, 3491; 28 U.S.C. §1696, 1741, 1742, 1781, 1783, 1784,
1785.
"See Amram, U.S. Ratification of Hague Convention on Service of Documents Abroad, 61 AJIL
1019 (1967).
"Supra note 26.
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within the jurisdiction of such court; and (ii) the foreign government (the
government of the alien invoking this privilege to sue) accords to citizens of the
United States the right to prosecute a claim against it (foreign government).
The necessity of showing reciprocity as a prerequisite for the maintenance of a
suit in the Court of Claims by an alien-including a contractor-is beyond
question, and the court has so held in Akiebolaget Imo-Industri v. U.S.,"
except in cases referred to the court by Congressional reference; so held in P.
Diacon Zadeh v. U.S. 30 in the following words:
... § 2509, U.S.C .... directs that report to the Congress include ... facts
claimed to excuse the claimant for not having resorted to any established legal
remedy .... Primary purpose of this section is to provide Congress or either House,
judicially determined facts for its use in determining whether or not certain private
claims warrant legislative relief, including the waiver of certain defenses otherwise
available to the United States.3
The issue of standing to sue the U.S. Government in the Court of Claims by
the foreign contractor has been well settled by Nippon Hodo Company Ltd. v.
U.S..32 hereafter referred to as Japanese case, where actions by Japanese
corporations against the U.S. on contract claims were maintained in the Court
of Claims by Chief Judge Jones. 28 U.S.C. 2502 reads as follows:
Citizens or subjects of any foreign government which accords to citizens of the
United States the right to prosecute claims against the government in its courts may
sue the United States in the Court of Claims if the subject matter is otherwise within
such court's jurisdiction.
This Section was codified in 1948, 62 Stat. 869, 976, but with minor changes
it was simply a reenactment of the Act of March 3, 1911, 36 Stat. 1087, 1139,
which in turn is derived from the Act of July 27, 1868, 15 Stat. 243. It appears
that prior to the Act of 1868, aliens could bring suit in the Court of Claims
without reference to reciprocal rights of United States citizens to sue in courts
of foreign countries, decision in Scharfer v. U.S.. " Wagner v. U.S., 14 point out
trends to this effect.
To prove the fact that U.S. citizens are given reciprocal treatment as
contemplated by 28 U.S.C. 2502, the following forms of proof may be taken into
consideration:
i. Deposition by an experienced member of a foreign bar,
ii. Statement(s) of Ministry of Justice or equivalent in the foreign country,
iii. Findings of the U.S. Department of State,
2101 Ct. C1. 483.
'1124 Ct. CI. 650.
"Id. at 651.
11285 F.2d 766.
'14 Ct. CI. 529.
"S Ct. C1. 637.
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iv. Statement(s) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or equivalent in the foreign
country,
v. U.S. citizen's right to sue a foreign government in a foreign court to be
determined as a whole and not in specie,
vi. Other nation's system of jurisprudence.
Deposition by an experienced member of foreign bar: In the Japanese case,"
the plaintiffs produced a deposition from a Japanese attorney, an experienced
member of the Tokyo Bar Association, stating in unequivocal language that an
American shared equally with a Japanese citizen "the right to sue the Japanese
State for breach of contract," 3 6 proof of foreign law by a witness who has
practised before the courts of that country, also accepted in Ferdinad F. Brown
V. U.S.37
STATEMENT(S) OF MINISTRY OF JUSTICE OR
EQUIVALENT IN THE FOREIGN COUNTRY
In the Japanese case38 the Statement of Director of Litigation of the Japanese
Ministry of Justice, affirming the deposition of Japanese attorney was accepted39
by the court.
FINDINGS OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND
STATEMENT(S) OF MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
EQUIVALENT IN THE FOREIGN COUNTRY
The Japanese case also indicates that the U.S. Department of State sought to
ascertain the status of American citizens before the courts of Japan, the Court of
Claims accepted the following statements-replies-from the Japanese Minister
of Foreign Affairs:
"Citizens of the United States are given the right equally with the Japanese subjects
to institute actions in Japanese courts against the Japanese Government, in regard to
claims arising from such legal relation between the citizens of the United States and
the Japanese Government as belong to the domain of private law. 4o
Similar correspondence from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was
accepted in Fichera v. U.S. and Michele Fischera et al. v. U.S.
4 1
From the records of the Japanese case it is not very clear whether the U.S.
State Department did make a finding of fact as to the status of American
citizens before the courts in Japan. There is no doubt that United States courts
would be very much inclined, and rightly so, to accept the findings of the U.S.
3 Supra note 32.
"Ibid., at 768.
115 Ct. Cl. 571.
"Supra note 32.
"Id. at p. 768.
40Od.
"See supra note 3, see also 9 Ct. Cl. 254.
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Department of State as to the status of U.S. citizens before courts in a foreign
country.
In a survey conducted by the U.S. Department of State, where it sent out a
circular on July 2, 1959 to all American diplomatic posts requesting that each
post ascertain whether (1) citizens of the country enjoy a right to bring suit
against the government (2) aliens are accorded national treatment in this
respect. Results of this survey indicate that 60 nations meet the test of
reciprocity42 there, by permitting American citizens to sue these governments in
their courts, thus entitling citizens including contractors of these countries to
sue the U.S. Government in the Court of Claims.
U.S. CITIZEN'S RIGHT TO SUE FOREIGN GOVERNMENT IN
FOREIGN COURTS; NATURE OF RIGHT AND OTHER
NATION'S SYSTEM OF JURISPRUDENCE
For a proper understanding of the legal right of U.S. citizens to sue a foreign
government in local courts like any local citizen, it is desirable to have an
understanding of the system of jurisprudence in that country, understanding as
to what extent a foreign government has shed the blanket of sovereign immunity
even in relation to its own citizens. It is a familiar principle that all governments
possess an immunity from suit, and it is only in a spirit of liberty and to promote
the ends of justice, that they ever allow themselves to be brought to court.
If it be granted at all, necessarily the regulations concerning it and the mode
of proceedings will differ as much as the governments themselves differ. In
United States v. O'Keefe43 the question was whether Great Britain accords to
U.S. citizens the right to prosecute claims against that government in its courts,
by "petition of right" to meet the test of reciprocity. The U.S. Supreme Court
agreed with the opinion of the Court of Claims in findings that:
In Great Britain there is no such right of prosecution, as existing at common law. And
the government of England accords to its subjects and aliens the right to prosecute
claims against it by petition of right given by the common law of England and
regulated by Statutes 23 and 24 Victoria, July 3, 1860.44
In relation to the modes and procedures, including payment of legitimate
fees, that indicate that granting of "petition of right" is at the will of the crown,
the court observed:
118 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, prepared by and under the direction of Majorie Whiteman,
Department of State Publication No. 8290 at pp. 411 to 413. These countries are: Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bolivia, Burma, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Federal Republic of Germany. Finland, France, Greece,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Ireland (tort only), Israel, Italy, Jordan, Korea,
Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Malaya, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Pakistan,
Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Peru, Portugal, Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sudan,
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Union of South Africa, United Arab Republic,
United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela and Vietnam.
4111 Wall 178, 20 L. Ed. 131.
"Ibid., at p. 132.
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It is of no consequence, theoretically speaking, that the permission of the crown is
necessary to filing of the petition, because it is the duty of the King to grant it and the
right of the subject to demand it.... Congress meant to confer on the British subject the
right to sue in the Court of Claims under the act... if in the ordinary course of the
administration of justice in England the law secures to the American citizen the right
to prosecute his claim against the government in its courts, that the petition of right
accomplishes this object, cannot admit of question. If the mode of proceeding to
enforce it be formal and ceremonious, it is nevertheless, a practical and efficient
remedy for invasion, by the sovereign power, of individual rights. 45
In Marcos v. United States4" the plaintiff, a Filipino, brought an action
against the U.S. Government, for recovery of the alleged value of cattle
requisitioned by the United States Army operating in the island of Mindanao in
the Philippines. The Court of Claims determined that the provisions of 18 P.L.
of Philippines 169 meet the test of reciprocity in the following words:
Admission of American citizens to Philippine courts with all rights of Philippine
citizens as against Philippine Government, enabled Filipinos to sue the U.S. in Court of
Claims under a statute that citizens or subjects of foreign government which accords to
citizens of United States the right to prosecute claims against their government in its
courts, may sue United States in Court of Claims, and, the fact that consent of
Philippine Government to be sued is more restricted that consent of U.S. Government
to be sued is not controlling. 47
Proof of reciprocity required is that a right is accorded to citizens of the
United States to prosecute claims against alien government in the courts of that
nation as a matter of procedure. The Court of Claims has interpreted this
requirement of proof very liberally as expressed in the following statement of
Judge Jones in the Japanese case:
Statute providing that the Court of Claims shall be open to any aliens whose govern-
ment accords to citizens of United States the right.to prosecute claims against their
governments in its courts, contemplated only that American citizens enjoy an equal
standing with the foreigners in actions against a foreign state and does not require that
scope of actions for which respective countries render themselves to suit be
coextensively identical and in pari materia.48
The scope covered by a petition of right under the common law system of
Great Britain, discussed earlier in this chapter once again was scrutinized by the
Court of Claims in John L. Brodie v. U.S., 49 in which the plaintiff sued to re-
cover for alleged use by the United States Government, without license or lawful
right, of patented invention covered by U.S. Letters Patent No. 1251959, issued
to one who at the time of grant of patent and commencement of suit was a
British subject. On the jurisdictional issue on the basis of requirement of re-
ciprocity the Court said:
4'Ibid., at p. 133-34.
1l102 F. Supp. 547.
'Ibid.. at p. 548.
"ISupra note 32 at 766.
"62 Ct. C1. 29.
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The true test is not whether a citizen of the U.S. may prosecute an action of a
particular nature in British courts, but whether the doors of British courts are open to
American citizens for prosecution of claims against the crown.10
Dowhey, J., delivering the opinion of the court, further stated:
A citizen of a foreign country which gives American citizens the same right of suit
against it as its own citizen have, may maintain the same kind of action in the Court of
Claims as is permitted to an American citizen, notwithstanding neither the American
citizen nor the said alien could maintain the sort of suit against the foreign
government. 1
An excellent summary of findings of the U.S. Department of State accepting
the reciprocity and showing an understanding of the system of jurisprudence of
various nations, permitting the U.S. citizen to sue foreign governments in their
courts, is quoted from 8 Digest of International Law, 2 Department of State
Publication No. 8290 pages 411-413:
(1) United States missions overseas have been requested to obtain information from
official or qualified unofficial sources as to the right of the alien to bring suit against
the state. This data was sought from all countries except the newly independent
African States and countries within the Soviet bloc. The requisite information was
obtained from all countries to which inquiries were directed except Afghanistan, El
Salvador, Luxembourg and Nicaragua.
(2) On the basis of this material it tentatively may be' concluded that in a substantial
majority of countries: (i) the citizen may bring suit against his government both in
contract and in tort; and (ii) the alien is accorded the same rights as the citizen in this
respect.
(3) In order to take due account of variations in national legal systems, it is necessary
to distinguish between five separate groups of countries, on the basis of the manner in
which the right to bring suit is derived. Three of these groups grant national treatment
to aliens in the same manner. The fourth consists of countries granting only a
conditional right of suit to aliens, and the fifth of countries where only limited rights
are extended to either citizens or aliens, or where no clear assurance of any right to sue
the state is to be found.
(4) The first group consists of countries having statutes which specifically authorize
suits against the state, and extend the right to bring suit to aliens either by statutory
language or by necessary implication. (It will be noted that most of these countries
have in their legal background the common law principle that the sovereign can do no
wrong):
Argentina, Australia, Burma, Canada, India, Iran, Ireland (tort only), Israel, Jordan
(contract only), Liberia, Malaya, Morocco, New Zealand, Pakistan, Sudan, Turkey,
Union of South Africa, United Kingdom.
(5) The second and largest group consists of countries with a civil-law tradition,
where the general tendency of the legal system is to equate the alien with the citizen in
matters involving the exercise of civil rights. In these countries the right to sue the state
derives: (i) in part from the concept of the state as a juridical person having rights and
obligations at private law (which in turn stems from the Roman law concept of the
"fisc"); and (ii) in part from the system of administrative courts, which originated in
France as a means of holding the state accountable for its actions in most public-law
matters without subjecting it to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.
"Ibid.. at p. 46.
"Ibid., at p. 29.
2Supra note 42.
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In most of these countries aliens are held to possess full civil rights including access
to the courts on the same basis as citizens. These rights occasionally are specifically
provided by statute. More often they are deduced from broadly worded constitutional
provisions or from the civil code or, more particularly, from the code of civil
procedure. In a number of cases the latter contains detailed provisions on the method
of bringing suit, although no substantive grant of a right to sue is to be found
anywhere in the codes.
Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Korea,
Lebanon, Libya, Mexico, Netherlands, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Vietnam.
(6) The third group consists of countries where the rights of both citizen and alien to
bring suit against the state derive from unwritten or "common law," or from tradition
or from an established feature of national jurisprudence.
Denmark (common law), Finland (common law), Haiti (jurisprudence), Iceland
(common law), Norway (common law), Philippines (jurisprudence), Saudi Arabia
(tradition).
(7) The fourth group consists of countries with a civil law tradition, in the main,
which grants citizens a right to bring suit against the state, but makes the enjoyment of
a like right by aliens contigent upon the existence of reciprocity or of pertinent treaty
provisions.
Austria (reciprocity), Bolivia (treaty), Republic of China (reciprocity), Italy
(reciprocity), Japan (reciprocity), Yugoslavia (reciprocity).
(8) The fifth group consists of countries where the right of either citizen or alien to
bring suit against the state is severely circumscribed, or where the legal situation is so
uncertain and fluid that no definite assurance of adequate rights for either citizen or
alien is to be had.
Cambodia (probable right of suit), Ceylon (tort only), Ethiopia (non resident alien
rights uncertain), Ghana (petition of right), Indonesia (probable of right of suit), Iraq
(limited right of suit), Laos (probable right of suit).
Thus it is clear that the right of a foreign contractor to sue the U.S. in the
Court of Claims is not incumbent upon a system of law or government of his
country, but on the showing that the doors in his country are open to American
citizens to sue the foreign government.
"Reciprocity" and National Treatment Obligations
of Foreign Governments in the U.S. Commercial
Qffshore Procurement Treaties
Over the period of its national history the United States has concluded many
commercial treaties that have provisions relating to civil judicial remedies, but
without specific reference to Court of Claims jurisdiction. In most of them there
have been broadly stated rights and privileges as to free access to the courts of
justice, either on the basis of unilateral policy objective or under the broad
spectrum of reciprocity. Of the 40 treaties of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation 3 in force on January 1973, almost all of them provide that:
I3Supra note 7.
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... nationals of either party shall be accorded national treatment... with respect to
access to the courts.
s5 4
National treatment is defined in the treaty as follows:
The term national treatment means treatment accorded within the territories of
party upon terms no less favorable than the treatment accorded therein, in like
situations, to nationals or companies, as the case may be, of such party. 5s
It is clear from the provisions quoted above that, under the treaty, each
government shall give equal treatment to the other with respect to access to the
respective courts. This equal treatment is in complete harmony with 28 U.S.C.
2502, to meet the test of reciprocity. "Equal treatment" is the controlling factor
both in the statute and in treaties. A similar harmonious construction of statute
and treaty "equal reciprocal treatment," was accepted by Laramore, J., in his
dissenting opinion as to the burden of proof of reciprocity under the statute in
the Japanese case, in the following words:
... it seems to me, that it must mean that each government shall give equal treatment
to the other with respect to access to the respective courts. As a matter of fact, this
would appear to be in complete harmony with the primary purpose of the statute,
which permits a foreign citizen or corporation to sue the United States in cases wherein
a foreign government accords to citizens of the United States, the right to prosecute
claims against their government in its courts. In other words "equal treatment" would
seem to be the controlling factor both in the Treaty and the Statute. 56
The U.S. Government also has "Offshore Procurement Bilateral
Agreements" in force on January 1973, with: Belgium, 7 Denmark, 8 Federal
Republic of Germany, 9 Greece,6" Israel, 61 France,6 2 Italy, 63 Luxembourg,64
Netherlands, 65 Spain, 66 Sweden,67 and Turkey. 68 In these treaties there is no
direct access-to-courts clause, but through other clauses maximum effort has
been made to treat the foreign contractor on the same footing as any domestic
contractor in government contracts. Article 12 of the treaty with Belgium
sTreaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between U.S. and Japan, 4 U.S.T. 2063, Sec.
1, Article IV.
"Ibid., Art. XXI.
I"Supra note 32 at p. 770.
115 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1311, T.I.A.S. 3000 as amended 3001, 3085.
589 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 141, T.I.A.S. 3987.
s*8 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 157, T.I.A.S. 3755 as supplemented to include Model Contract 8 U.S.T.
497, T.I.A.S. 3804.
103 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 5330, T.I.A.S. 2738.
'16 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 983, T.I.A.S. 5839.
112 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 3132, T.I.A.S. 4914.
115 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2185, T.I.A.S. 3383.
146 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 4009, T.I.A.S. 3416.
s5 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2027, T.I.A.S. 3069.
115 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 2328, T.I.A.S. 3094 as amended 7 U.S.T. 3460, T.I.A.S. 3721; 10 U.S.T. &
O.I.A. 344, T.I.A.S. 4196.
0'3 U.S.T. & O.IA. 2968, T.I.A.S. 2480.
"86 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 3729. T.I.A.S. 3372.
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provides that ". . . offshore procurement contracts between the United States
Government and either Belgian private contractors or the Belgian Government
will contain such clauses as are required by U.S. laws." '6 9
Termination for convenience clauses in a standard form contract that is a
part of most of the treaties, guarantees equitable adjustment without specific
reference to the Court of Claims. Changes Clause in the standard form contract
of the treaties is another very good example, when it provides for equitable
adjustment without referring to the Court of Claims, ". . . if any such change
causes an increase or decrease in the cost of, or the time required for,
performance of this contract, an equitable adjustment shall be made in contract
price delivery schedules or both. .. ."10 These clauses treat the foreign
contractor just like any domestic contractor, and entitle him to seek relief
against the U.S. Government in the U.S. courts on the same footing as a
domestic contractor.
On the question whether citizens of 40 nations,71 whose government under the
Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation guarantee national
treatment to American citizens meet the test of reciprocity to entitle them to sue
the United States in the Court of Claims; the author's answer is yes, based on
the interpretation accepted by the Court of Claims in Marcos v. U.S., 72 United
States v. James 0 'Keefe, " John L. Brodie v. U.S., 14 and the Japanese case. It
has been fairly well settled that countries opening the doors of their courts to the
suits of American citizens against their government meet the test of reciprocity.
At this point it should be observed that jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, in
cases arising upon treaties, is withheld from the Court of Claims. According to
the recognized practice of nations, such claims are usually adjusted by special
process, since they partake of a political character which renders it proper that
they should be under the immediate supervision of Congress.75 But we are
dealing with claims arising out of contracts with foreign contractors, to which
treaty obligations apply only as a broad umbrella.
II. Other United States Federal Courts
In the United States from the beginning, the question of access by aliens,
contractors to U.S. courts, was related to assignment of jurisdiction to Federal
courts. Alexander Hamilton, wrote in The Federalist:





'1102 F. Supp. 547.
" I1 Wall 178-184, 20 L. Ed. 131.
1162 Ct. Cl. 29.
"See Remarks of Mr. Porter, Cong. Globe, 37th Cong. 2d. Sess. Appendix p. 124 (April 15,
1862).
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among just causes of war, it will follow, that the federal judiciary ought to have
cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other countries are concerned. 76
Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution looked at this principle. The
Judicial Act of 1789 laid down in broad outline the competence of Federal
courts with respect to suits involving aliens.7' The act gave these courts jurisdic-
tion over suits by aliens, including contractors, among others "over suits of a
civil nature at common law or in equity involving $500 or more to which an alien
was a party." 78
By the current version of 28 U.S.C. 1332, the amount in controversy must
exceed $10,000. In addition to cases involving federal questions under the
Constitution, Federal law or treaties, an alien, including a contractor, may gain
access on appeal, to the highest Federal court." National legislation subsequent
to the original Judiciary Act, has widened the alien contractor's right of access
to courts against the U.S, specially under the Tucker Act, presently codified
under 28 U.S.C. §1346(a) (1964):
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court of
Claims of: (2) Any other civil action or claim against the U.S. not exceeding $10,000 in
amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or upon any Act of Congress or any
regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with
the U.S. or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.
It should be pointed out here that "all claims," "any contract," founded on
"any law of Congress," or "any regulation" implicitly cover any or all foreign/
international claims founded on any law of Congress, regulation of executive
department, against the United States.
Applicability of Rules of Civil Procedure;
Administrative Law and Implications of U.S. Immigration
Laws as Related Actions by Alien Contractors
Rule 17(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that a suit must be
brought by a real party in interest and Administrative Procedure Act Sec. 10(a),
5 U.S.C. 1009(a) recognizes a right of judicial review by any person "suffering
legal wrong because of an agency action or aggrieved by such action within the
meaning of any relevant statute." Yet despite the breadth of language in the
latter statute, the federal courts usually have adhered to somewhat restrictive
rules in recognizing an alien's standing to sue. In immigration disputes,
non-resident aliens have generally been denied standing to sue on the ground
that the immigration statutes evidenced such an intent. Section 10 of the




79Dodge v. Cunnard S.S. Co., 19 F.2d. 500.
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§1009, Judicial review of agency action: except so far as (1) statute precludes agency
review or (2) agency action is by law committed to agency discretion.
Legal wrong or adversely affected is a pre-requisite for standing to seek
judicial review. Allegations of less serious economic injury have been held
insufficient to support standing to sue in a number of cases.80 In Perkins v.
Lukens SteeL 81 the complainant's lack of standing to sue was based upon
principles implicit in the Constitutional division of authority in the U.S. System
of Government, and the impropriety of judicial interpretations of law at the
instance of those who show no more than a possible injury to the public.
A more difficult question arises if the aggrieved party is outside the United
States, since under the Federal Rule 17(a) a person is not deemed to have
standing to challenge an administrative determination or action unless he
himself is a party to a proceeding in which the determination is made, or unless
he is directly affected by the result.82
Under this requirement, the principle that the foreign contractor has to be
party to the proceedings and circumstances requiring his physical presence in
the United States may arise. In that situation the U.S. Immigration laws would
come into the picture, and clearance from them as well as local requirements
could take their own time, sometimes to the prejudice of the interests of the
foreign contractor.83 However Prof. Charles Gordon makes a point in his
treatise,8 Sec. 3, that this preclusion may be modified in the light of appalling
situations. Because of the U.S. policy of selective immigration control and the
differential national origins quota feature of U.S. Immigration Laws the United
States is not in a position to agree to a most favored nation treatment clause.
Therefore, the approach devised takes the form of a non-contingent rule that
positively assures the reciprocal admission, and indefinite sojourn, of
individuals who function in an international commerce or investment
capacity. 5 Because it is positive, this commitment is subject to the reserved
"1Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Authority, 306 U.S. 118, Young Americans for
Freedom Inc. v. Rusk, 205 F. Supp. 603 (D.C. D.C. 1962); Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher-
workmen of Nother America AFL-CIO v. Rogers, 186 F. Supp. 114 (D.C. D.C. 1960).
11310 U.S. 113 (1940).
"
2See Davis, Adm. Law Treatise, Ch. 22, in which the restrictiveness of the Federal rules is crit-
icized. See also GELLHORN AND BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, p. 256.
"
3Young Americans for Freedom Inc. v. Rusk, 205 F. Supp. 603. The court had no authority to
intrude into the political field of government and could not compel secretary of state to grant
visa.... Plaintiff, invoking the right to declaratory judgment must have standing to sue. See pre-
cautionary note in Brownwell v. Tom We Shung, 352 U.S. at 184, "we do not suggest of course that
an alien who has never presented himself at the borders of this country may avail himself of the
declaratory judgment action by bringing the action from abroad." Also see note of Supreme Court
in Dectaur v. Paulding (14 Pet. 947), quoted in Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co. at p. 131, 132: "The
interference of the courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of the executive departments
of Government would be productive of nothing but mischief and we are quite satisfied that such a
power was never intended to be given to them."
"GORDON & ROSENFIELD: 2 IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE Sec. 8.3 (Rev. ed. 1971).
"Present statutory authority for these "treaty trader" and "treaty investor" clauses is contained
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right of each country to exclude or expel particular individuals who are deemed
undesirable, for health, morality or security reasons.
The contract claim dilemma is in large measure a question of appropriate
relationship between administrative and judicial remedies available for the
resolution of government contract disputes. This proposition stands true for the
claims of U.S. foreign contractors also. The value of administrative procedure is
attested by the fact that, over the years, a large proportion of disputes processed
administratively has been resolved without resort to the courts. It is feared that
a foreign contractor may reluctantly accept an unsatisfactory administrative
settlement rather than pursue the long and uncertain course of judicial review.
Foreign Contractor's Standing in Judicial Review in
District Courts on the Basis of "Wrongful Injury
and Protection of Interest Theory"
In Constructores Civiles de Cen. TroAmerica, S.A. (CONCICA) v. John
Hannah et al., U.S., 86 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia was
faced with the question of standing, sovereign immunity and preclusion of
judicial review in relation to government contracts. The case involved a
Honduras Corporation which sought an injunctive and declaratory judgment
against the administrator and several subordinate officials of the Agency for
International Development (AID), in connection with disqualification of the
foreign corporation (prospective contractor) as bidder on road construction
contracts in Honduras.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Matthew F.
McGuire, J., dismissed the complaint for insufficiency and plaintiff appealed.
The Court of Appeals, Tamm, J., held that for purposes of standing, challenge
to Agency action (AID decision), disqualifying the plaintiff Central American
Corporation from bidding on projects (future construction projects) was
arguably within the "zone of interest" to be protected or regulated by the
statutes involved. The court also held that even though plaintiff was a
non-resident alien, it had standing to challenge the agency's decision.
The standing of a foreign contractor to sue in district courts is distinguishable
from the standing of non-resident aliens in immigration cases. As mentioned
earlier in immigration disputes non-resident aliens have generally been denied
standing on the ground that statutes evidenced such an intent. In the matters
involving foreign contractors there is no indication that Congress intended to
in §101(a). (15)(E) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 168, 8 U.S.C. 1101
(1952). For comment see Wilson, "Treaty Merchant" Clauses in Commercial Treaties of the United
States, 44 AJIL 149 (1950); and "Treaty Investor" Clauses in Commercial Treaties of the U.S., 49
AJIL 336 (1955).
'"459 F.2d. 1183 (1972).
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limit review, or to entrust the matter to the finality of the administration
process.87
In Brownell v. Tom We Shung, 88 the Court observed "... exemptions from
the . . . Administrative Procedure Act are not lightly to be presumed . . . and
unless made by clear language or supersedure the expanded mode of review
granted by the Act cannot be modified." A person may be just as "affected or
aggrieved" by agency action within the terms of the Administrative Procedure
Act, if he is a non-resident alien contractor as if he was an alien or a domestic
contractor.
Furthermore, the Administrative Procedure Act uses the words "any person" 6
not "any citizen," and persons include natural as well as legal entities.
Congressional intent that a particular plaintiff has the right of review may be
found either in express statutory language granting it to the plaintiffs class, or,
in the absence of such express language, in statutory indicia from which a right
to review may be inferred. Reviewability may ordinarily be inferred from
evidence that Congress intended the class to be a beneficiary of the statute
under which the plaintiff raises his claim.
In the CONCICA case the court followed the Scanwell-Ballerina
PenBlackhawk trilogy, 8 9 in deciding the question of judicial reviewability of the
agency action: (i) injury in fact; (ii) allegation of arbitrary, capricious or illegal
agency action; (iii) arguably within the zone of interests. Any foreign
contractor's standing to sue the United States in the Federal District Courts
must meet the above three requirements. The law of standing as developed by
the U.S. Supreme Court has become an area of incredible complexity.9"
The extent of judicial review of decisions of the Appeals Boards or the
contracting officer is governed by the language-of-disputes clause in the
contract and the relevant statutory provisions. The function of reviewing and
administrative decision can be and frequently is performed by a court of original
jurisdiction, as well as by an appellate tribunal. From the CONCICA case, it
seems to be well settled that the foreign contractor has the right to have his day
in the Federal courts of the United States.
Recommendations
One procedural recommendation is for the Court of Claims to adopt rules to
"Almost all U.S. foreign procurement is done by negotiations under the authority 10 U.S.C.
2304(a)(6), from the decision in Wheelabrator Corp. v. John Chafee, Secy. of the Navy, 147 U.S.
App. D.C. 238, 455 F.2d. 1306, it seems that determination to make negotiations as permitted by
10 U.S.C. 2304 (a)(14) or strictly a failure to take action is "committed to agency discretion by law,"
within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act 5 U.S.C. 701(a)(2) (1970).
"352 U.S. 180; S. Ct. 252, 256.
"Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d. 859 (1970).
' The Court has itself characterized its law of standing as a "complicated speciality of federal jur-
isdiction," United States ex rel Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953).
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the effect that in the conduct of "business abroad," the Court of Claims should
not only look at the U.S. domestic laws, but also give proper regard to
international law, treaty law, international agreements and domestic law of the
contractor's country.
The subject of responsibility of states in relation to their contractors has
certain aspects that are dependent upon or co-existent with each other. Thus,
there exists under international law, an international standard of justice,
actually a collectivity of standards the denial of any one of which is denominated
"denial of justice," entailing the responsibility of the state. Co-existing with
such standard, is the general rule of exhaustion of remedies available in the
local state.
"There is no principle of international law which makes it the duty of one
nation to assume the collection of claims of its citizens against another nation, if
the citizens themselves have ample means of redress without intervention of
their governments."'" A private person armed with no power of enforcing his
rights, cannot speak in sufficiently impressive tones to insure his being heard by
a foreign nation. At the same time, when a citizen applies to his government to
press his claim against a foreign power, he does so subject to the wise and
judicious discretion which a nation has a right to exercise in determining its
duty to itself, the citizen and the foreign power. 92
The U.S. Department of State's position on exhaustion of local remedies is in
conformity with the position taken by British, French and other Governments, 93
which requires that states do not interfere with the regular course of the
administration of justice in which an alien is a party, until he shall have taken
his case to the court of last resort. 9' This rule is subject to certain exceptions.95
Before taking up the claims, a state must be satisfied that its citizens have
exhausted the means of legal redress offered by tribunals of the country that
gave rise to the claim.
It is recommended that other countries, whose citizens do business with the
U.S. Government (foreign contractors), and who have the right to sue the U.S.
Government for their claims or interests-money claims-in the U.S. Court of
Claims under the reciprocity theory or-injunctive, accounting or declaratory
relief-in U.S. Federal courts under the wrongful-injury and protection-of-
interest theory, must insist that these contractors first seek the relief from the
courts of the United States of America.
A large portion of claims of federal contractors may thus be dealt with in the
simple and justifiable routine of the U.S. Court of Claims and other Federal
"New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 90.
"
2U.S. v. Laabra Silver Min. Co., 29 Ct. Cl. 432.
"
3For detailed discussion, see Exhaustion of Local Remedies. DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
Dept. of State Publication No. 8290 at p. 769 to 783.
'10 p. ATTY. GEN. 25. 26.
"Ibid., note 93 at p. 779.
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courts. Forcing the maximum number of cases involving foreign contractors
into municipal courts, and their disposition under the watchful eyes of
"international justice" standards, should lead a wider incorporation of
international standards into municipal standards and vice versa. This will bring
consequent beneficial effects for legal protection of alien contractors.
This will also reduce international adjudication to the minimum that
otherwise might be a costly, burdensome, time consuming task, and there are
obvious advantages in keeping as much litigation as possible out of
international channels.
It is necessary to make certain that international character of the claim of an
alien contractor against the U.S. Government is not destroyed, and that
possibility of recovery at an international level is retained. This purpose is very
well served by making the claim of the contractor itself independent of the
exhaustion of local remedies, and by considering this requirement of resort to
municipal courts of the United States, as a procedural or jurisdictional rather
than as a substantive one.
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